June 11, 2018
During recent years, the rise of terrorism and radical Islamic groups have contributed
to closer scrutiny of this religion and the way it has affected, or has been affected by, modern
era. On the other hand, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, as a German philosopher and cultural
critic in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, left a profound influence on modern
intellectual history. He considered himself Schopenhauer’s heir but Bertrand Russell believed
that Nietzsche outpaced him because of the consistency of his doctrine (Russell 521). Laying
apart his under-dispute anti-Semitism, Nietzsche’s censuring religions, Christianity in
particular, seems to bar out Islam. His tribute to Islam has taxed many scholars since Islam is
intrinsically more monotheist and anti-paganism than Christianity.
The fact that Nietzsche never directly or indirectly cited the Qur’an in his corpus
(Almond, Representations 46) affords the foundation of scholar’s separating these two
bodies. This paper sets out to shed more light on how and in what ways Nietzsche was
affected by Islam by examining (any) consistencies between Nietzsche’s Übermensch in
particular and some of Qur’anic verses. This line of reasoning attempts to elaborate the why
of Nietzsche’s benign stance on Islam. Capturing a common ground in these two seemingly
disparate bodies of knowledge doesn’t valuate or devaluate either of them, but invigorates
fresh perspectives freed from modern or postmodern obliquities.
Very few studies have been conducted on the relationship between Nietzsche and
Islam (Almond 1). Almond in his paper entitled as “Nietzsche’s Peace with Islam: My
Enemy's Enemy Is My Friend” refers to the “surprising frequency” of Nietzsche’s
appropriation of Islam as a tool against “Judo-Christian modernity” (1). Documenting
Nietzsche’s personal letters he picks his way to show that his interest in Islam was merely
due to his “fascination with extremities (2). In addition, Nietzsche’s avowed hatred of
German culture which Almond calls his “cultural claustrophobia” can transmute into craving
for “Orient”. From Almond’s perspective, Nietzsche praises Islam since it “is more life-
embracing and ‘manly’ than its Judaeo-Christian sister faiths (11). He finally agitates the
question “which Islam is Nietzsche’s Islam”, whose answer due to the lack of access to
Nietzsche’s incomplete perceptions of Islam remains blurred (12). Almond later attests the
affinity of Nietzsche’s patriarchal thoughts subjugating women with those of Islam
(Representations of Islam in the West 45). Nietzsche’s chronological and geographical lack of
access to Islam furthurs Almond’s discussion on the “Medieval” type of Islam’s impact on
Roy Jackson in his Nietzsche and Islam attempts to elaborate on Nietzsche’s
“generosity” (1) toward Islam. Jackson’s insights lend a supporting hand in elucidating the
big why of this generosity, however according to Birns, the major flaw in his book is its
weird lack of any citation from Nietzsche. Birns hold that this wanting connotes an
orientation toward Islam rather than an objective scholarly balance.
An Übermensch is psychologically strong, has the ability to flout the dogma, resists
despair, and drinks his life to dregs. Dealing with Nietzsche makes one encircled within a
nexus of inseparable continua; however, the aforementioned dimensions of an Übermensch
divide this paper into four parts, each tracing similar implications in the Qur’an, Muslims’
most sacred book.
Nietzsche’s definition of an Übermensch is a person who not only doesn’t succumb to
his contemporary conventions, but also tries his best to redefine his era’s values (Thus Spake
Zarathustra 12-13). A superman in Nietzsche’s view stands against his ancestors’ and
contemporary belief system not in favor of a goal but as a mean in itself; “the word
‘Superman,’… is something that must be surpassed. That man is a bridge and not a goal”
(166). This aspect of an Übermensch is associated with Nietzsche’s Dionysian state and its
“complete unchaining of all symbolic powers” (Burnham and Jesinghausen 50). His
Dionysian vs. Apollonian philosophy calls for a new perspective toward life, a perspective
which levels the importance of joy, freedom, and dynamism with logic, framework, and fixity
Nietzsche’s Übermensch is in fact “the crystallization of the thought that man can
develop beyond the present stage of his existence-and hence should” (Simmel 235). In his
Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche pays great credit to humane potentialities (Thompson 10-
23), a credit which, according to Roy Jackson, is paid by Islam too (151) whereas Christianity
vividly suspects, if not condemns, human being. This humane potentiality coupled with
fusion of Apollonian and Dionysian drives results in “the great achievement of Ancient
Greek tragedy” (Sedgwick 4). Jackson in the seventh chapter of his Nietzsche and
Islamresents Muhammad as Nietzschean Übermensch, and supports his argument with not
few evidence one of which is Muhammad’s unconventional eccentricity:
Muhammad represents a man—and he was ‘only’ a man—who, despite doubts as to
his own purpose, puts aside the security of a successful business and a loving wife, as
well as a respected member of society. He becomes an outcast, mocked by many and
even believes himself to have gone mad. All signs of the Übermensch will appear as
signs of illness or madness to the human herd. (151)
Jackson limits his study to Muhammad’s life and personality, whereas the present
study sets out to concentrate on his book, the Qur’an. Among numerous English translation of
the Qur’an, Pickthall’s “stands out as the first English translation by a Muslim whose first
language was English” (Greifenhagen 282). In his Meanings of the Holy Qur’an, he
frequently applauds such unorthodox attitudes. Abraham is a particular case in this point, on
whom this study limits itself since this name has been mentioned for over sixty-five times in
different chapters and verses. Moreover, Abraham receives tribute rather repeatedly (Al-
Imran 3:95, 84; Maryam 19:41; Al-Mumtahana 60:4; Yusuf 12:6; as-Saffat 37:104; Sad
38:45) and he is the only prophet who was chosen as Allah’s friend; “Allah (Himself) chose
Abraham for friend” (an?Nisa' 4:125). It can never be claimed that either Abraham or any
other Qur’anic figure discussed in this paper was a true Nietzschean Superman, since they all
were monotheists, but the fact that they share major traits of an Übermensch cannot be
overlooked. As an idol breaker, Abraham, receives tribute in the 71st to 73rd verses of the
twenty-first Surah, Al-Anbiyaa, which narrates his story:
And, by Allah, I shall circumvent your idols after ye have gone away and turned your
backs. (57) Then he reduced them to fragments, all save the chief of them, that haply
they might have recourse to it. (58) They said: Who hath done this to our gods?
Surely it must be some evil- doer. (59) They said: We heard a youth make mention of
them, who is called Abraham. (60) They said: Then bring him (hither) before the
people’s eyes that they may testify. (61) They said: Is it thou who hast done this to our
gods, O Abraham? (62) He said: But this, their chief hath done it. So question them, if
they can speak. (63) Then gathered they apart and said: Lo! ye yourselves are the
wrong-doers. (64) And they were utterly confounded, and they said: Well thou know
that these speak not. (65) He said: Worship ye then instead of Allah that which cannot
profit you at all, nor harm you? (66) Fie on you and all that ye worship instead of
Allah! Have ye then no sense? (67) They cried: Burn him and stand by your gods, if
ye will be doing. (68) We said: O fire, be coolness and peace for Abraham,( 69 ) And
they wished to set a snare for him, but We made them the greater losers. (70) And We
rescued him and Lot (and brought them) to the land which We have blessed for (all)
peoples (71) And We bestowed upon him Isaac, and Jacob as a grandson. Each of
them We made righteous (72) And We made them chiefs who guide by Our
command, and We inspired in them the doing of good deeds and the right
establishment of worship and the giving of alms, and they were worshippers of Us
Transcending the story on the surface, an “idol” may represent any dogmatic
conventions inherited through ages. Dogmas and prejudices are condemned by Nietzsche
again and again in his value theory (The Will to Power 131). Abraham, in this sense, is a
superman calling the society to get rid of the serpent’s “skin” (The Gay Science 246).
Nietzsche views a “snake shedding its skin as a symbol of the necessity of renewal or
growth” (Burnham 304). Moreover, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, a serpent is considered the
wisest animal. “An eagle soared through the sky in wide circles, and on him there hung a
serpent, not like prey but like a friend…’The proudest animal under the sun and the wisest
animal under the sun-they have gone out on a search’ ” (Kaufmann 137). It can be inferred
that being wise requires the ability to resist getting attuned. In in the 258th verse of Al-
Baqara, Pickthall refers to the way Abraham opposes his king in a dialogue:
Bethink thee of him who had an argument with Abraham about his Lord, because
Allah had given him the kingdom; how, when Abraham said: My Lord is He Who
gives life and causes death, he answered: I give life and cause death. Abraham said:
Lo! Allah causes the sun to rise in the East, so do thou cause it to come up from the
West. Thus was the disbeliever abashed. And Allah guides not wrongdoing folk.
For Nietzsche, an Übermensch reaches the maximum of power “as a violent force of
destruction” to transcend the previous faith and conviction (The Will to Power 18). Pickthall
also advocates a consciously selective attitude toward the ancestor’s beliefs when he lionizes
Abraham for raising his voice against his father, Azar. (al?An`am 6:74-6, 83; At-Tauba
9:114; Az-Zukhruf 43:26). In the nineteenth Surah, Maryam, Abraham’s dialogue with his
father/uncle is as follows:
When he said unto his father: O my father! Why worship thou that which heard not
nor see, nor can in aught avail thee? (42) O my father! Lo! there hath come unto me
of knowledge that which came not unto thee. So follow me, and I will lead thee on a
right path. (43) O my father! Serve not the devil. Lo! the devil is a rebel unto the
Beneficent. (44) O my father! Lo! I fear lest a punishment from the Beneficent
overtake thee so that thou become a comrade of the devil. (45) He said: Reject thou
my gods, O Abraham? If thou cease not, I shall surely stone thee. Depart from me a
long while! (46) He said: Peace be unto thee! I shall ask forgiveness of my Lord for
thee. Lo! He was ever gracious unto me. (47) I shall withdraw from you and that unto
which ye pray beside Allah, and I shall pray unto my Lord. It may be that, in prayer
unto my Lord, I shall not be unblest. (48) So, when he had withdrawn from them and
that which they were worshipping beside Allah, We gave him Isaac and Jacob. Each
of them We made a prophet (49).
In addition to opposing his own father, Abraham encourages his addresses to leave
their (grand) father’s beliefs behind and embrace new ones:
When he said unto his father and his folk: What worship ye? (70) They said: We
worship idols, and are ever devoted unto them. (71) He said: Do they hear you when
ye cry? (72) Or do they benefit or harm you? (73) They said: Nay, but we found our
fathers acting on this wise. (74) He said: See now that which ye worship, (75) Ye and
your forefathers! (76) Lo! they are (all) an enemy unto me, save the Lord of the
Another major trait of Nietzsche’s Übermensch is his being responsible for his life.
From Nietzsche’s viewpoint, one of pillars in forking modern man and Übermensch is the
latter’s ability to burden himself with his life (Mugge 190). Nietzsche admits the difficulties
of modern life but rejects being a nihilist (Reginster 25-28; White 83-97). He celebrates life
in spite of its difficulties. In fact, Nietzsche calls the modern man’s attention to the nihilistic
situation he is struggling with, in order not to present a model but to represent an emergency
situation in need of an effort to be attended (Gillespie 537-554).
In this respect, Nietzsche’s prescription for the modern man bears a close resemblance
to what Pickthall in his Meanings of the Holy Qur’an advocates:
Lo! as for those whom the angels take) in death (while they wrong themselves,) the
angels (will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the
land.) The angels (will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have
migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end /
Except the feeble among men, and the women, and the children, who are unable to
devise a plan and are not shown a way / As for such, it may be that Allah will pardon
them. Allah is ever Clement, Forgiving (an?Nisa' 4:97-99).
The verses above vividly represent disapproval of a weak type of human being and link the
discussion to the next section of the study.
Nietzsche’s objection of institutionalized Christianity is actuated by the “slave
morality” it propagates which privileges the stolidity of the “lower order” (Leiter 124) and
bears nihilism (Beshop 259). He brands Christianity with reproach since its advent capsized
“master morality” (Leiter 193-222) by glorifying the hunger of the impecunious and vilifying
the wealth of the noble. Such inverted ideology caused by the introduction of the concepts of
“sin” and redemption is Nietzsche’s point of departure in his anti-Christian philosophy
Such Christian weak-authorization ideology is vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s Übermensch who
challenges himself as much as he can, so as to reveal his true potentials .e.g. Abraham. For
him, men grow not because of the good intentions of people but because of the perils and
demanding situations they confront. In Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ, he praises
Julius Caesar for his “maximum of authority and discipline towards himself” and pursues
by maintaining that “it was great danger which made of them something deserving reverence,
danger which first teaches us to know our resources, our virtues, our shield and spear, our
spirit – which compels us to be strong” (89). It is worth mentioning that Übermensch’s
“strength” is not necessarily social or political, but psychological (May 51). In fact, it beats
against resentment and guilt which are Christianity’s fundamental substructures.
Acampora studies the significance of the subtitle of Ecce Homo, (365-382)
Nietzsche’s favorite motto taken from Pindar, “Become what you are” (the Gay Science 270;
335). Her analysis traces Wagner in Nietzsche and rises the dichotomy of selflessness and
selfishness. She sums up her interpretations of the motto, “become what you are” as
managing one’s drives to an end and to become a “necessity” rather than a chance (378).
The first Surah of the Qur’an, the Opening, revolves around the theme of man
worshiping Allah; “Thee (alone) we worship; Thee( alone )we ask for help / Show us the
straight path, / The path of those whom Thou hast favoured; Not the( path )of those who earn
Thine anger nor of those who go astray” (1:5-7). These verses, the fifth verse in particular,
present the man addressing his creator and asking him for guidance to the right path. A brief
explanation of “the straight path” is provided later in the seventh verse; it is a path which is
the path of those people god has “favoured”. What here is of utmost importance is the word
“favour”. In order to reach at a more precise translation of this word, it would be beneficial to
consult other translations as well. According to Omar’s Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an, the
meaning of “An’amata” in the classical Arabic is that “thou hast bestowed thy blessings”
(570). Therefore, Arberry in his translation, provides a more accurate meaning than
Pickthall’s “favored”; “Guide us in the straight path / the path of those whom Thou hast
blessed, not of those against whom Thou art wrathful, nor of those who are astray (The
Opening 1:6-7). Accordingly, people in the straight/right path are those who are “blessed”.
Blessing can be both spiritual and material. Examining it in the context of Meanings
of the Holy Qur’an, gives one the impression of an umbrella term; “And whatever of comfort
ye enjoy, it is from Allah” (An-Nahl 16:53). Blessing in the Qur’an signifies a range of
different meanings including God’s forgiveness (Al-Qasas 28:17), a complete religion (Al-
Maidah 5:3; Al-Fat-h 48:2), Qur’an itself (Al-Baqara 2:231), security from abuse and
oppression (Al-Maidah 5:1; Ibrahim 14:6; Al-Imran 3:174; Al-Qamar 54:35) , food (An-Nahl
16:72), delight and gift in heaven (Al-Maidah 5:65; At-Tauba 9:21; Yunus 10:9; Al-
Mutaffifeen 83:22; Al-Infitar 82:13; Al-Qalam 68:34; Al-Waqi’a 56:89; At-Tur 52:17 ),
superiority over other creatures (Al-Maidah 5:20), housing, shelter and clothing (An-Nahl
16:80-81), mental health (At-Tur 52:29; Al-Qalam65:2), and science (Yusuf 12:6 ). What
stands out in this amalgam, is that the right/straight path, recommended to the man, cannot be
the path of the weak. A weakness which is condemned in Nietzsche’s philosophy as “passive
nihilism” and reads as a type of meaninglessness that “no longer attacks”. An august version
of this nihilism is Buddhism which is, for Nietzsche, a sign of weakness” (The Will to Power
According to Salter, Nietzsche’s Übermensch is novel since it is attainable by human
being and has nothing to do with “‘superhuman’ excellencies and Divine qualities” (Salter
421). An example of an Übermensch for Nietzsche is Goethe who is “a man of tolerance … a
man for whom nothing is forbidden, except it be weakness” (Twilight of the Idols 74).
Nietzsche’s philosophy stands on the shoulders of Arthur Schopenhauer, but similar
to what Carl Jung did to his master, Sigmund Freud, he also went beyond or even rejected
Schopenhauerean philosophy (Ivan 160-161). This digression, mainly, concerns Nietzsche’s
viewing “the issue of whether life is worth living” where he lays aside Schopenhauer’s
pessimism (163) and justifies the whole eternity by affirming one single joyful incident of life
(The Will to Power 563-64). According to Nietzsche, one must carry on living in spite of
life’s adversities; “Superman, is a man … rejoicing over his noontides and evenings, as
advances to new rosy dawns” (Thus Spake Zarathustra 166). Nietzsche celebrates life’s
awkwardness in his Amor Fati attitude and his maxim of note, “what does not kill me makes
me stronger” (Twilight of the Idols 5).
This dimension of Nietzsche’s Übermensch runs parallel with his dichotomization of
fundamental drives of human being, Apollonian and Dionysian, where he contrasts the age of
Homer in Roman with pre-Socratic Greece (Burnham and Jesinghausen 28-9). In addition to
“music” and “dance”(28), for Nietzsche, the definition of the Dionysian state reads as
follows; “Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to life
rejoicing in the sacrifice of its highest types to its own inexhaustibility—this is what I called
Nietzsche sets his thoughts at odds with “what he conceives as the theological
economy of Hegelian spirit” (Abbinnett 9). Nietzsche openly resents “the life denying
Christian morality” (97) in the thirteenth chapter of The Birth of Tragedy as well as his Anti-
Christ (18), but he quite approbates Islam pointing out that “If Islam despises Christianity, it
is a thousand times right to do so: Islam presupposes men” (qtd. in Pearson and Duncan 497).
He later praises Muhammad, Prophet of Islam, for his earthly rather than other-worldly life-
style (Almond Representations 46). Muhammad Iqbal “employed Nietzsche’s philosophy in
conceiving Muhammad as an Übermensch, as a paradigm of life-affirmation” (qtd. in Roy
The symbol of earthly life in the Qur’an is Solomon who is the most affluent prophet
enjoying an incomparable power and wealth both synchronically and diachronically; “He
said: My Lord! Forgive me and bestow on me sovereignty such as shall not belong to any
after me Lo! Thou art the Bestower” (Sad 38:35). Solomon’s property exceeds to
supernatural; “So We made the wind subservient unto him, setting fair by his command
whithersoever he intended. / And the unruly, every builder and diver, (made We subservient)
/ And others linked together in chains” (38:36-8). Subsequently, Solomon is granted freedom
to do as he pleases with what he has received: “(Saying): This is Our gift, so bestow thou, or
withhold, without reckoning” (38:39). Such prosperity and freedom, bringing happiness in
the earthly life, couples with a guaranteed other-world in the following verse; “And lo! he
hath favour with Us, and a happy journey’s end” (38:40). Pickthall seem to yield neither to
the prioritization of the other world nor to the inversion of the prioritization. He equates them
as if both are in line with each other. He later in the second chapter restates this match up;
“And who doth greater wrong than he who forbiddeth the approach to the sanctuaries of
Allah lest His name should be mentioned therein, and striveth for their ruin? … Theirs in the
world is ignominy and theirs in the Hereafter is an awful doom” (Al-Baqara 2:114).
Nietzsche puts forward a positive conception of joy which is also and necessarily
tragic and pessimistic (McIntyre 5). Nietzsche does not simply offer a new theoretical
conception of reality, but he wishes instead to cultivate a joy in reality that will embody
freedom or sovereignty. Joy in the actual presupposes the cultivation of individuals strong
enough to practice this freedom (McIntyre 23)
Active Nihilism/Resisting Despair
Nihilism for Nietzsche refers to a world devoid of values (Reginster 21-25), but he
goes on to further elaborate it by bisecting it to two types; The first is “Nihilism as a sign of
increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism” and the second is “Nihilism as decline and
recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 17).
For Nietzsche, “to be Dionysian is to affirm life” and to overpower the essential ordeal of
existence not through nullifying the suffering but through activating the potentialities of the
animal nature within us (Sedgwick 38). It is worth pointing out that such activation of
potentialities contributes to Nietzschean Übermensch (39). Reginster provides a whole
chapter on genealogical study of Nietzsche’s emphasis upon “overcoming despair” (148-200)
and encapsulates this dimension of an Übermensch as follows; “you affirm life if you react
with joy to the prospect of its eternal recurrence” (202).
Similarly, Pickthall proposes an analogous approach to the prophets inviting them to
abandon despair when they are disappointed or hopeless; “Let not their conduct grieve thee,
who run easily to disbelief, for Lo! they injure Allah not at all. It is Allah’s will to assign
them no portion in the Hereafter, and theirs will be an awful doom (Al-Imran 3:176). He later
in the fifth chapter addresses Muhammad with a thou-shalt-not attitude toward despair: “O
Messenger! Let not them grieve thee who vie one with another in the race to disbelief” (Al-
Maidah 5:41). The repetition of theme of running-counter-to- despair throughout the further
chapters of the Qur’an, lends support to this argument (Al-An’am 6:48; Yunus 10:65; An-
Nahl 16:127; An-Naml 27:70; Al-Ankabut 29:33; Luqman 31:23; Ya-Sin 36:76).
Ross Abbinnett in his Politics of Happiness studies western view of the concept of
happiness within different political ideologies starting from Enlightenment to postmodern
Derrida. Abbinnett, socially and economically, links Nietzsche’s joy and the egoistic
satisfaction of fascism and postmodernism and asserts that happiness for Nietzsche “is related
to man’s capacity for self-overcoming” (11). Similarly, in the chapter nineteenth of the
Meanings of the Holy Qur’an, Pickthall narrates the story of Holy Mary conceiving her
pregnancy. When “the pangs of childbirth drove her unto the trunk of the palm tree She said:
Oh, would that I had died ere this and had become a thing of naught, forgotten! / Then (one)
cried unto her from below her, saying: Grieve not! Thy Lord hath placed a rivulet beneath
thee (Maryam 19:23-4). Another female Übermensch in the Qur’an is Moses’ mother who
resists despair and takes the huge risk of throwing her baby into river, a risk which was the
only possible, though improbable, way to keep her baby alive. Pickthall narrates her story as
And We inspired the mother of Moses, saying: Suckle him and, when thou fear for hi
m, then cast him into the river and fear not nor grieve. Lo! We shall bring him back u
nto thee and shall make him (one) of Our messengers. / And the family of Pharaoh too
k him up, that he might become for them an enemy and a sorrow, Lo! Pharaoh and Ha
man and their hosts were ever sinning /… So We restored him to his mother that she m
ight be comforted and not grieve, and that she might know that the promise of Allah is
true. But most of them know not. (Al-Qasas 28:7-8, 13)
The invitation to relinquish despair is a recurrent theme in the Qur’an pointing to all b
elievers, from prophets to the virtuous (Al-A’raf 7:49; Al-Anbiyaa 21:103; Fatir 35:34; Az-Zu
mar 39:61; Ha-Mim 41:30; Az-Zukhruf 43:68; Al-Ahqaf 46:13). Pickthall also relates that a
man under the guidance of God is never frightened or cheerless (Al-Baqara 2:38; Al-Imran 3:
139; At-Tauba 9:40). It can be inferred that, according to Pickthall, a melancholy person is no
t receiving the guidance of Qur’an’s God. This assertion takes an inclusive attitude in the 62nd
verse by embracing other religions, e.g. “Jews …Christians, and Sabaeans …whoever believ
eth in Allah and the Last Day and doeth right” and promising that “and there shall no fear co
me upon them neither shall they grieve” (Al-Baqara 2:62; Al-Maidah 5:69). Moving forth in t
his chapter this assertion keeps being restated (Al-Baqara 2:112) and later involves the benefa
ctors (Al-Baqara 2:112, 274) and God’s Friends as well (Yunus 10:62).
The seventh chapter expands the scope to all “Children of Adam” who say yes to
God’s “messengers” refrain “from evil and amended” (Al-A’raf 7:35). Pickthall later
blames the fighters in the battle of Uhud for their melancholy. He ascertains that unpleasant
feeling is doomed; “When ye climbed (the hill) and paid no heed to anyone, while the
messenger, in your rear, was calling you (to fight). Therefore He rewarded you grief for (his)
grief, that (He might teach) you not to sorrow either for that which ye missed or for that
which befell you” (Al-Imran 3:153). Last but not least, Pickthall assets that melancholy is the
Devil’s goal in whispering in the ear of man. The Devil conspires to “vex those who believe;
but he can harm them not at all unless by Allah's leave” (Al-A’raf 58:10). The word “vex” is
the translation of Yahzunu, whose root is Hazana, and according to Omar’s Dictionary of the
Holy Qur’an, signifies “To grieve” (121).
Abbinnett, Ross. Politics of Happiness: Connecting the Philosophical Ideas of Hegel, Nietzsc
he and Derrida to the Political Ideologies of Happiness. Bloomsbury Publishing USA,
2013, pp. 10.
Acampora, Christa Davis. “Beholding Nietzsche: Ecce Homo, Fate, and Freedom.” Oxford
Handbook on Nietzsche, Edited by John Richardson and Kenneth Gemes. Oxford UP,
Alan, White. “Nietzschean Nihilism: A Typology.” Nietzsche. Routledge, 2018, pp. 83-98.
Almond, Ian. “Nietzsche’s Peace with Islam: My Enemy’s Enemy Is My Friend.” German Life
and Letters, vol. 56, no. 1, 2003, pp. 43-55.
—. Representations of Islam in the West. 2010, academia.edu,
Birns, Nicholas. “Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam.” 2007, Nietzschecirlce,
Bishop, Paul. A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works. vol. 114, Camden House,
2012, p. 259.
Burnham, Douglas. The Nietzsche Dictionary. Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 304.
Burnham, Douglas and Martin Jesinghausen. Nietzsche's ‘the Birth of Tragedy’: A Reader's
Guide. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010, pp. 28-9.
Gillespie, Michael Allen. “Nietzsche and the premodernist critique of postmodernity.” Critical
Review, vol. 11, no. 4, 1997, pp. 537-554.
Greifenhagen, Franz V. “Traduttore Traditore: An Analysis of the History of English
Translations of the Qur’an.” Islam and Christian?Muslim Relations, vol. 3, no. 2, 1992,
Jackson, Roy. Nietzsche and Islam. Routledge, 2007, p. 151.
May, Simon. Nietzsche’s Ethics and His War On’morality'. Oxford UP, 1999, pp. 51-8.
Leiter, Brian. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality. Routledge, 2003,
p. 124; 193-222.
McIntyre, Alex. The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche’s Vision of Grand Politics. U of Toronto
Press, 1997, pp. 5, 23.
Mügge, Maximilian A. “Eugenics and the superman: A racial science, and a racial religion.”
The Eugenics Review, vol. 1, no.3, 1909, p.190.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs,
Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1974, p.246.
—. The Portable Nietzsche, Edited & translated by Walter Kaufmann, Kingsport, 1976.
—. Thus Spake Zarathustra, Translated by Thomas Common, Project Gutenberg, 1999, pp. 12-
13. bo-ok.xyz, b-ok.xyz/dl/263494/cfae9c.
—. The Will to Power, Translated by W. Kaufman and RT Hollingdale and edited, with
Commentary, by W. Kaufman, Vintage Books, 1967, p. 131,563-64.
—. Twilight of the Idols: How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Translated by Duncan Large,
New York, Oxford UP, 1998, p.5, 74,187, 89.
—. The Anti-Christ. Translated by H L Mencken, The Floating Press, 2010, p. 18.
Omar, Abdul mannan. “na’ama.” Dictionary of Holy Qur’an, NOOR foundation-international,
13.” Library of Congress Control. No. 2005298281. 2010, p. 570, 121.
Pearson, Keith Ansell, and Duncan Large. The Nietzsche Reader. Blackwell, 2006, p. 497.
Pickthall, Marmaduke William. The Meaning of the Glorious Qur?an: Text and Explanatory
Translation. Amana Publications, 1999.
Reginster, Bernard. The affirmation of life: Nietzsche on overcoming nihilism. Harvard UP,
2009, pp. 25-28.
Russell, Bertrand. “Nietzsche.” A History of Western Philosophy, Rutledge, 2004, p. 552. NTS
Salter, William M. “Nietzsche's Superman.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods, vol. 12, no. 16, 1915, pp. 421-438.
Sedgwick, Peter R. Nietzsche: The Key Concepts. Routledge, 2009, pp. 25-8.
Simmel, Georg. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Translated by H. Loskandl, D. Weinstein, and M.
Weinstein, 1986, p. 235.
Soll, Ivan. “Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s “Great Teacher” and “Antipode”." The Oxford
Handbook of Nietzsche. 2013, p. 165.
Thompson, Neil. “Existentialist ethics: from Nietzsche to Sartre and beyond.” Ethics and
Social Welfare 2.1, 2008, pp. 10-23.